![](https://emergencyservicestimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/ESS-Button-resized.png")
The government recently announced the demise of Police and Crime Commissioners from May 2028 and described the governance model as a ‘failed experiment’ before setting out arrangements that will see police and crime boards made up of local elected officials in areas where there are no directly elected mayors.
It is not a surprise given low turnout and poor name recognition and while questions have regularly been asked about what tangible difference these roles really make, there are risks in removing the only direct democratic link in policing.
One of these risks is the loss of public voice from a directly elected figure and with name recognition low for the PCC today, how will that be improved by a committee and a lead who is not directly elected to the role?
Policing by consent relies on local oversight. The removal of clear democratic accountability in the form of the PCC risks eroding trust and consent. There is a risk that scrutiny of policing could be diluted if suitable alternatives mechanisms are not put in place. Without the PCC, public influence on crime plans and on the budget vanishes.
As the role disappears, it’s crucial to ensure that an alternative system is put in place that avoids leaving a gaping hole in public engagement around policing.
As Gavin Stephens, Chair of the National Police Chiefs’ Council, recently explained: “Democratic accountability of operationally independent policing is essential. Bringing strong, integrated local leadership and the voice of communities into our service is a vitally important part of policing by consent.”
For me, there are several options to preserve meaningful democratic accountability starting with strengthening and reforming Police and Crime Panels (which will be removed under the new arrangements). One way to do this is to give them real power: budget veto authority, mandatory public hearings on force performance, and resources for independent research. Crucially, include community representatives alongside councillor members to ensure a genuine citizen voice.
A second option would be to introduce mandatory community assemblies to examine policing priorities in each force area. These randomly selected panels (similar to jury duty) could review budgets, set local priorities, and scrutinise chief constables. This approach has worked in Belgium and Ireland for contentious policy issues bringing genuine public input without relying on elections with poor turnout.
And publish transparent performance frameworks, providing real-time, accessible data on crime, budgets, and force responses. Pair this with statutory duties for whoever takes over PCC functions (elected mayors or local councils) to hold quarterly public Q&A sessions specifically on policing. The key is visibility and obligation, making it impossible to bury policing among dozens of other responsibilities.
There is also merit in examining policing governance models from around the world.
New Zealand’s Independent Police Conduct Authority
New Zealand separates operational oversight (by an appointed board) from complaint investigations (an independent statutory body). This dual structure ensures professional governance while maintaining public trust through arms-length accountability. For England and Wales, this could mean retaining police boards but creating stronger, more independent inspection regimes with citizen representation.
Scandinavian Consultation Councils
Norway and Denmark use local police consultation councils – statutory bodies made up of residents, business groups, and community organisations. They don’t run the police but have formal powers to shape priorities and demand responses. These councils meet publicly and report to parliament, providing structured community voice without relying on elections.
Canadian Civilian Review Boards
Many Canadian cities use civilian review boards with powers to investigate complaints, recommend policy changes, and publicly report on force conduct. Board members are appointed through competitive processes emphasising community representation. This model balances expertise with accessibility. Crucially, boards have real teeth and public visibility.
The core trade-off
International evidence shows professional oversight can work efficiently but it requires genuine community representation built into structures, strong transparency and reporting obligations, independent inspection with real consequences and cultural change so forces see engagement as core business, not box-ticking.
Without such structures, abolishing PCCs simply trades a weak form of democratic accountability for no democratic accountability at all. The engagement problems that plagued PCCs will only worsen when the public has no direct say whatsoever. If the government is serious about reducing the democratic deficit rather than deepening it, these structural safeguards aren’t optional extras. They are key to maintaining policing by consent.
Read more – Police and Crime Commissioners to be abolished.
